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CHAPTER IV.
DEALING WITH THE CHINESE
Alfred le S. Jenkins*
The continuing Chinese revolution is certainly the biggest and possibly
the most thoroughgoing social transformation the world has ever seen. My
first posting in the Foreign Service was to Peking, as was my last. So great
were the changes in the quarter-century intervening, my experience was,
indeed, "a tale of two cities." It is awesome to watch one of the world's oldest
civilizations methodically taking itself apart - at times, as during the height
of the tumultuous Cultural Revolution, seemingly blasting itself apart - and
then meticulously trying to put itself back together again in a vastly different
form. The course which that revolution will eventually take will have a
profound effect on the future of us all. Especially affected will be the manner
in which the United States relates to the Chinese - including of course,
Taiwan.
For more than 3,000 years, the Chinese developed their remarkable
culture with minimal outside influence. When the Middle Kingdom was
invaded, its invaders tended to adopt the more advanced Chinese civilization.
The Chinese naturally came to view themselves as the center of world
civilization. In the middle of the last century, however, the comfort of China's
womb-like isolation and the self-satisfaction of its presumed centrality were
shattered by the not-so-civilized military and economic insistencies of the
industrially advanced West. The erosion of the two thousand year-old
Confucian social order began. For the better part of a century, the
increasingly conscious, deliberate destruction of that ancient social order by
the Chinese themselves has caused repeated crises of national authority.
At the turn of the century, America's trade and other interests in China
prompted us to proclaim the so-called Open Door policy. This helped save
China from dismemberment by the Europeans, the Japanese and the
Russians, but we were quick to share in the rapacity of those powers, short of
territorial demands. At the same time, our rather pious interpretation of the
Open Door policy fostered in us an affectionate, yet presumptuous protective
feeling for the Chinese. This was strongly nurtured by the missionaries who
followed the battleships into China. In general, the missionary effort was
viewed by the then religiously eclectic and tolerant Chinese as an imperti-
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nent claim to a monopoly on truth, as well as a fundamental challenge to the
Chinese way of life. Indeed, the modernizing influence of the secular
institutions so prolifically spawned by the missionary effort - hospitals,
schools and colleges - caused violent opposition to the missionary effort, a
violence finally resulting in the Boxer Uprising. Just how much religious
impact the missionaries made on China is moot, but they certainly made a
heavy impact on America. Many a dollar was dropped into the collection plate
with the sincere and fraternal, if naive, hope of saving our "heathen" Chinese
brothers from starvation of their bodies and damnation of their souls. The
century and a quarter love-hate relationship had been well established.
The Nationalist, supposedly democratic, Revolution of 1911 intensified
American sympathy for China. Under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen and
subsequently, Chiang Kai-shek, fairly substantial social and economic
progress was made, especially considering the magnitude of the problems.
But the long Sino-Japanese war fragmented the country and undermined the
integrity of the Nationalist Revolution. The regime became venal and
ineffective, and along with civil war, inflation finished it off until its revival
on Taiwan. The Communist revolution gained its strength from the peasants
apd the intelligentsia, promising land and national dignity after China's 100
years of ignominy.
Many people have forgotten that our diplomatic and consular personnel
remained on the mainland of China for months after the Communist
take-over, until the Communists made it impossible for us to stay with any
semblance of dignity. I myself remained some eight months under the
Communists in Tientsin where I had been transferred after two years in
Peking. When I was called home, I was asked by the Assistant Secretary of
State whether I thought we should recognize the new regime.' I said I
supposed eventually we should, for I suspected it was there to stay; but I did
not think we should be hasty, partly because I was not convinced that the
new regime would return the compliment! Chairman Mao had announced the
previous summer his "lean to one side" policy (i.e. toward the Soviet Union)
yet, for the ensuing decade it seemed on the surface more like a "prostrate to
one side" policy.
It is not surprising that capitalism is a dirty word in China, where the
free enterprise system never evolved as it did in the West. Furthermore,
capitalism in China was inextricably associated with semi-colonialism. China
is, of course, Communist in ultimate intent and Socialist in present practice. I
1. Editor's Note: The Assistant Secretary of State to whom Mr. Jenkins refers
was W. Walton Butterworth, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (1947-49).
Today, the office is entitled, Assistant Secretary of State, East Asian and Pacific
Affairs.
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doubt that the intent will ever materialize and the socialist structure is in
trouble. In the past, the Chinese have tried to reach their goals largely
through a combination of exhortation and intimidation but they are now
finding that these methods have severe limitations. Communist society in
China has been a grey one, with little room for the soul to run and jump. But
Chinese practicality seems to be coming cautiously to the surface. Actually,
Chairman Mao was not a very orthodox Marxist and his most successful
followers are turning out to be not very orthodox Maoists. Maoism was
designed for a sedentary, chiefly agrarian society and industrialization, a
course on which China seems now irrevocably set, will bring very fundamen-
tal changes in the nature of the society - mobility, urbanization and, of
course, better education. (The Chinese may or may not succeed in their efforts
to prevent the large cities from becoming larger, but countless smaller cities
are certain to spring up.) In short, I believe the Chinese people are among the
most pragmatic on earth. They have an enormous affinity for that which
works. I believe that the Chinese will prove too intelligent and perceptive to
hold on indefinitely to anachronistic policies out of blind loyalty to ossified
dogma.
So far, the Chinese revolution has taken sharp twists and turns. During
periods of relative leniency, the intelligentsia and the technocrats have
usually come forward, regretting their emergence in the inevitable period of
orthodoxy which followed. Accordingly, the foreigner has experienced varying
negotiation climates, depending, not only on the state of bilateral or
multilateral relations, but also on the trends of Chinese domestic policy.
The first contact I had with Chinese Communists was heartening. In
mid-January 1949, on the day after the battle for Tientsin ended, the Consul
General and I met with some half dozen members of the People's Liberation
Army who were temporarily running the city. They were an impressive lot:
young, clean-cut, intelligent, articulate, personable, and almost intrusively
healthy. We were given a perfectly reasonable lecture on how there would no
longer be special privileges for foreigners in the New China, a change of
which we fully approved. We were assured that so long as we dealt on a basis
of equality and reciprocity we could expect mutually satisfactory dealings.
The discussions were pleasant and cautiously friendly.
Satisfactory dealings, however, turned out to be more than two decades
away. While we were waiting for "the dust to settle" after the Chinese civil
war, the Korean War intervened and changed our China policy overnight.
The U.S. China policy became one of declared opposition to Peking and
resumption of support for Taipei.
The long and bitter negotiations for the peace treaty at Panmunjom
baptized us in the realities of the adversary type of negotiation with the
Chinese, and the even more drawn-out Warsaw talks with them further
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educated us in this type of frustrating, unsavory and largely sterile exercise.
The Warsaw talks, carried on for the better part of fifteen years, resulted in
but one negotiated agreement (on repatriation of citizens) and involved
rejection of more than twenty proposals. There were times when each side
evidently wanted to make a limited approach to the other, such as the policy
of an exchange of newsmen. Not until 1970 did this readiness appear on both
sides at the same time. During the 50s, the bitter legacy of the Korean War
and the paranoia induced by the McCarthy era prevented a United States
approach to the Chinese. During this decade, the Chinese were somewhat
forthcoming; by the mid-50s, they desired formal U.S. recognition, and I
suspect, were already finding problems in their ostensibly understudy
relationship with the Soviet "big brothers." Indeed, the climate was such that
the negotiations I carried on in Geneva in 1954 were conducted with
unfailing civility and partial success in obtaining release of Americans
detained in China against their will.
During the 60s, we tried to be more open-minded but found the roles
switched. The Chinese were then not ready to move. They were picking up
the pieces from the economically disastrous (but partially, politically
successful) Great Leap Forward; they had had three bad crop years and they
were adjusting to the departure of the Soviet technicians. Understandably,
they would not negotiate from weakness. Furthermore, they were unhappy
even then with our policy toward Vietnam and, of course, with our continuing
support of Taiwan. So, in the mid-60s, the Cultural Revolution and the Red
Guard disruptions began. China entered upon its own version of a paranoic
"McCarthy period" in which they could not have anything to do with the
so-called imperialists. During this very electric period, an even more
stringent form of adversary negotiation ensued. For a time, the Warsaw talks
were even broken off. This tense atmosphere was finally dispelled and
relations were incrementally established following a series of events. The
Cultural Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Brezhnev
Doctrine, Soviet cocktail party talk of a possible "surgical operation" to
remove Chinese nuclear installations and an enormous Soviet military
build-up on the long Sino-Soviet border all combined to make possible
ping-pong diplomacy and the Kissinger and Nixon trips to seek detente.
I should like to return to the characteristics of adversary negotiation.
When Alex Johnson met with the Chinese at the ambassadorial level in 1955
to initiate the series of talks which later became the Warsaw Talks, he
arranged the chairs more or less in a circle. He wanted to avoid the adversary
implications of dividing the chairs into opposing sides, and to invite
informality which was so lacking in the exasperating Panmunjom negotia-
tions. When it was, however, the Chinese turn to arrange the second meeting,
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they placed the chairs so that opposing sides faced each other across a gap.
This remained the pattern for the next fifteen years of palaver.
Actually, the talks did provide the space and time for a then pathologic-
ally Sino-centric, revolutionary China and a world-oriented, conservative
America to adjust to each other's markedly different styles, policies and
philosophies. They provided a forum for bringing up a very wide range of
subjects of mutual interest and concern; even when no tangible results were
forthcoming, the subtle evidences of changes in terminology and emphasis
from crisis to crisis contributed toward the all-too-little mutual understand-
ing possible in that hostile circumstance. At least the two governments had
the means of signaling each other promptly and, if necessary, in confidence.
(The confidence was obtained only in a rare meeting between the two
ambassadors in one or the other of their embassies. The regular conference
room was bugged.) The mechanism of the talks proved to be especially
valuable in tailoring down the military action in the off-shore island crises.
For the most part, however, the talks were used for an exchange of
polemics and for painfully soporific recitations of positions. I attended
nineteen talks in Warsaw as an adviser, first to Ambassador Jacob Beam and
then to Ambassador John Cabot. Sometimes it seemed as if each side was
making credit points with its own exigent gallery back home rather than
talking to the party across the table. Today, some of these exchanges read
like petulant attempts to make mere debating points. I cringe to recall that I
was "particeps criminis" in these dreary exchanges, for in addition to
advising on some of the Warsaw talks, I drafted the guidance in Washington
for many of the others. Yet the climate of the time made it all deadly serious.
When in a strictly adversary relationship, the average Chinese nego-
tiator is a highly Sino-centric chauvinist, a dedicated ideologue, evincing the
static and provincial quality of Chairman Mao's thinking. He is usually,
however, very articulate and has done his homework thoroughly. He has a
consuming, not to say blinding, sense of national rectitude. In the past, he
could be expected to have a distressingly limited understanding of the rapidly
evolving modern world and its implications, but that is changing as more
Chinese have travelled and attended conferences and meetings all over the
world. He is persistent and likely to be numbingly verbose, using repetition
in the tiresome manner of Madison Avenue - and often with the same
telling effect.
The Chinese negotiator will usually be armed with a cascade of facts, but
they may only be used to embellish doctrinal preconceptions, with little logic
or relation to the real world. Facts will often play a subservient rather than a
corrective role in forming a conclusion. The "non-negotiable" principle and
rigid dogma will be foremost. If on our part, however, we exhibit persistence,
composure, patience and sometimes a very valuable bit of insouciance, the
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"non-negotiable" will sometimes turn out to be negotiable, or will quietly
drop out of-the discussion. While the Chinese positions may be couched in
ringing ideological terms, they are almost certainly more intimately related
to the more pragmatic concerns of national security, vital interests and
China's standing in the world - all of which have a perverse way of flying in
the face of ideology.
In the adversary role of negotiating, the Chinese are particularly prone
to extensive use of hyperbole, characteristic of authoritarian societies,
especially heirarchical ones. China continues to be both. (For some reason,
however, the phraseology in Chinese does not sound quite so stark as it does
when literally translated into English.) In addition, they will often use
maddeningly patronizing phraseology, such as "We caution the United States
side to ponder this well." Although sensitive to matters of face themselves,
the Chinese are masters of invective and insult when engaged in adversary
negotiations. They use rudeness in hopes of making the other side lose its
temper.
The Chinese are usually sophisticated in tactics. This may be evinced in
the very beginning when they try to affect the substance of negotiations by
the way in which an item is phrased in the agenda. The battle for the agenda
can, in fact, be crucial. Also, a Chinese negotiator would not show satisfaction
at an achieved success while negotiations are in progress; he knows this
would enhance his opponent's competitive resolve. He may be quite "poker-
faced" throughout. The novice may think a proposal he has offered is meeting
with approval, or at least with tolerance, because there is initially no overt
show of disapproval. Later, he may find that it is totally unacceptable. Henry
Kissinger places the Chinese high on the list of sophisticated, able
negotiators; but then he was negotiating with the most sophisticated,
personable and effective of them all: the late Premier Chou En-lai, whom I
consider to be one of the most impressive diplomats of all time. Of course, we
were meeting with him in a far more agreeable climate than the former
strictly adversary one. The Chinese can be incomparably likeable when the
occasion permits.
The Chinese are more willing than most westerners to forego immediate
advantages if they would come at the cost of long-term disadvantages. This
may be related to the different sense of time in East and West. The American
wants immediate results because his watchful constituency demands them.
Knowing this, the Chinese often play very effectively on public opinion. The
traditional approach to time, it should be noted, is reinforced by the
Communist belief that time is on the side of Communism, courtesy of alleged
historical inevitability.
In Chinese Communist adversary negotiation, capitulation leading to the
defeat of the opponent is the goal; compromise in finding common ground on
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which to stand, for mutual profit, is the more classical, but not universal,
western pattern.
It was mentioned earlier that Chinese Communism is a secular religion.
It has virtually all of the trappings of a religion: canonized writings, a strong
sense of mission and of infallibility, an abhorrence of heretics, and for a time
during the Cultural Revolution, even a near-deified leader. All that was
lacking was a devil, and for a time we were elected. For a while, the Soviet
Union was a strong competitor for that role, surging ahead in the seventies.
During the 50s and 60s, the Chinese seemed to regard enmity between
China and the United States as basic, natural and destined to be long-lived.
This philosophy embraced the possibility of periods of peace or even of
collaboration, but the long-term inimical nature of the relationship remained.
This philosophy, however, would seem to be based on pristine dogma
unsullied by reality. If dogma is set aside, there is little reason why our two
countries should not get along reasonably well. Our economies seem
complementary; there are many areas in which we can learn from each other.
We have no troublesome contiguous territories, and when given a decent
chance, the personal chemistry between our two people appears to be
uncommonly felicitous.
I believe we cannot yet be sure whether we are in one of those temporary
periods of a beneficial relationship that is destined to revert some day to a
more hostile confrontation, or whether the earlier philosophy of Peking may
itself have evolved. Certainly the negotiations with the Chinese in the 70s
have been a very different proposition from those of the 50s and 60s. Most of
the world was relieved when the representatives of two great nations in
hostile confrontation for twenty-two years sat down and talked with courtesy
and candor, listening and responding reasonably and constructively. This had
rarely happened before. In the Kissinger-Chou negotiations prior to the
Nixon trip, there was astoundingly full and frank give-and-take. Each side
not only gained a clearer grasp of the thinking of the other, but more
importantly, they gained a clearer understanding of just why each side
thought as it did. There was little peddling of dogma and no diplomatic
double-talk. Those negotiations in Peking were fascinating, exhilarating and,
for the most part, satisfying. The Chinese were tough, but they were
forthright, fair and generally constructive. We gained respect and liking for
most of our Chinese counterparts, even while warmly disagreeing with them
on a number of issues. Those several trips to China were emotion-filled for an
incurable Sinophile such as myself. I derived great satisfaction from the
cautious understatement of our new-found relationship. The unnatural
intensity of the traditional love-hate syndrome in Sino-American relations
seemed to have become muted, more objective and realistic, making the new
reltationship much more likely to last. Our increased understanding of
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China's past humiliation reached the level of empathy. We were able to
recognize China's legitimate security interests while stating clearly our
opposition to foreign domination of Asian developments. We gained renewed
appreciation for China's magnificent culture but had serious reservations
about some of the curious courses it was currently taking. And, last but not
least, we gained a far greater understanding of the uniquely complex and
difficult problems of modernization and change which China faces.
My heading the advance group which opened the U.S. Liaison Office in
Peking in April 1973 several weeks before the arrival of Ambassador Bruce
was an especially gratifying privilege. I could not have asked for better
cooperation from the Chinese in that endeavor.
In the past few years, the fond hope has grown that the Chinese now
realize that borrowing from the technologically advanced centers of the world
will not resolve their problems. Rather, the Chinese must gear their
technological development into an increasingly interdependent, transnational
economic and cultural world matrix. That hope may be overblown. But at a
minimum, our two nations have found some common ground on which we can
build mutually profitable cooperation in quite an array of fields. Each has a
clearer view of those national priorities which may be safely pursued on a
shrinking, interdependent planet. For that the whole world should be
thankful, and with care, we can build towards more.
Much of that requisite care involves understanding the fundamentally
different nature of the problems faced by each society, the different historical
antecedents and the different current motivations, so that we may discover
how diversity can be made to enrich an association rather than poison it.
Neither the normally placid Chinese nor the normally jaunty American is
inscrutable, unless one fails to scrutinize. If we will only spend the necessary
time and energy in forming a clearer understanding of the basic beliefs and
motivational impellents of others as well as ourselves, then our natural
kinship with all humankind might emerge more clearly and we may outgrow
the precious tenacities of exclusive monopolies on truth - petty luxuries
simply no longer affordable in our polyglot global community.
